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Management accountants in France: a range of fragile, open-ended positionings 
Caroline Lambert & Jérémy Morales1 
Abstract 
 
In France, management accountants do not form an officially recognized profession, and 
their careers follow many diverse trajectories, with positioning that is open-ended but 
also fragile in relation to operational staff and other related functions (such as IT or 
quality). In this chapter we show that the specificities of the French “pattern of action” 
and the historical dynamics of the function’s emergence help to shape the challenges and 
opportunities facing management accountants in France today. 
 
Introduction 
It was only in the 1970s that the position of management accountants ‘flourished’ in 
French firms and French organizations more broadly. Today, many management 
accountants occupy relatively strategic positions given their direct contact with the CFOs, 
who are becoming more important as financial methods of management become 
generalized (Zorn, 2004). Contrary to what was sometimes predicted in the past, they 
look unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future (Bouquin & Fiol, 2007). However, the 
occupation covers such a heterogeneous collection of activities, roles and profiles that it 
can be difficult to define what they have in common. Management accountants’ work is 
always affected by its organizational setting, and this explains the diversity of 
positionings observed. Yet certain features connected with historical and cultural 
backgrounds have an influence on the occupation, and although it would be an 
exaggeration to talk of a “French-style” management accountant, France does have a 
certain national tradition that goes some way to explaining the practical expressions of 
                                               
1 We would like to thank Laetitia Legalais, Ludivine Redslob and Hicham Sebti for offering instructive 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
Goretzki & Strauss: « The Role of the Management Accountant » 
 
 2 
management accounting observed in French business. The dominance of engineers and 
the “honor principle” (d’Iribarne, 1989; 1994) help to grasp the environment in which 
management accountants work in France. As we shall see, this context often forces 
management accountants in France to position themselves in relation to competing 
functions and “sell their work to the operationals”2. 
 
Historical background to the function’s emergence: the dominance of engineers 
In the United States, the emergence of management accounting dates back to the 1920s. It 
was marked from the outset by a clearly financial orientation. Alfred Sloan and 
Donaldson Brown were both qualified engineers, but what made them famous was the 
introduction of financial ratios (the famous ROI pyramid) and control of a primarily 
budgetary and profit-driven nature at General Motors and DuPont (Sloan, 1963). In the 
United Kingdom, cost accountants appeared as early as the First World War and soon 
gained significant influence, under the explicit model of the accounting profession in the 
UK (Loft, 1986). In France, the principles of “contrôle de gestion”, literally 
“management control”, spread essentially from the 1960s, chiefly through engineers 
(Bhimani, 1998). The struggles between engineers and accountants to have sole 
competence for management accounting happened in different ways in France and the 
United States. 
In France, the management accounting field had long been the preserve of engineers3, 
especially graduates of the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique (Moutet, 1984), some of 
whom headed projects that were accounting, industrial and political in nature all at once 
(Bouquin, 1995; 2008; 2011). Lieutenant-Colonel Emile Rimailho (inventor of a method 
for allocating indirect charges called the “homogeneous sections” method) and Auguste 
Detoeuf (the first president of Alsthom and promoter of uniformized cost calculation 
methods), are good examples (Bouquin, 1995; 1997; Lemarchand and Le Roy, 2000). 
                                               
2 This is an ambiguous expression. French management accountants generally talk of “operationals”, a term 
that seems to cover anyone who does not work in the finance division. The primary aim is to distinguish 
bookkeeping tasks, which can be done from the desk, from decision support tasks, which need management 
accountants to spend more time with people up and down the hierarchical line. 
3 In the sense that the term is commonly used, engineers in France form a homogeneous group of people 
who have a high level of studies certified by a qualification, and enjoy high status. Historically, engineers 
have been part of the country’s economic and political elite (Bourdieu, 1989). 
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The dominance of engineers, with their talent for complex numerical reasoning, doubtless 
explains the level of sophistication found in the management accounting methods adopted 
by French firms (Bhimani, 1998; Bouquin, 2008). 
Also, French management committees have not been affected by the “rising power” of 
the accounting function as much as observed in the United Kingdom and United States. 
Referring to a 1972 study by the British Management Institute about management 
committee membership, Armstrong (1985, p.129) underlined that more British Chairs and 
CEOs had a banking or accounting background than a technical engineering-type 
background. Fligstein (1990) reported similar observations for the United States. In 
contrast, a study of French employers from 1912 to 1973 by Levy-Leboyer (1979) 
showed the dominant role played in management bodies by engineers, many of them 
graduates of the top engineering schools, particularly the Ecole Polytechnique. Even 
today, the top French engineering schools supply close to 50% of the managers of the 
largest French firms (Gomez and Guedri, 2014).  
In a context where technical development of control systems and management accounting 
was attributable to engineers, the principal managers were for a long time reluctant to 
appoint management controllers, whom they did not perceive as providing any added 
value. In the first edition of Echanges, the principal journal for management accounting 
practitioners in France, de Fréminville (1967) rejected the idea of using the services of a 
management accountant, arguing that “control” was the CEO’s responsibility and “no-
one else can do it for him”. The title of “management controller” was also “hard to accept 
for the management, who find it too ambitious”, and “the people who might bear the title, 
because it does not give them the degree of prestige and authority to which they believe 
they are entitled” (de Fréminville, 1967)4. Furthermore, as Martin (1969) observed 
following a study conducted for the Association Nationale des Contrôleurs de Gestion 
(ANCG)5 of French management accountants (who in this study were called contrôleurs 
                                               
4 All English translations of French quotations are the authors’ own. 
5 This association, now renamed the Association Nationale des Directeurs Financiers et de Contrôle de 
Gestion (DFCG), is not a professional association in the Anglo-American sense, as it originated in the 
Cegos, a private vocational and in-service training center set up by French employers in 1926 to spread the 
principles of scientific management. Since 1967, the association has published the journal Echanges 
(whose editorial board and authors are business executives). In practice, this association is a network that 
does not issue any qualifications and has few connections with higher education and research.  
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d’affaires or “business controllers”) in French subsidiaries of US firms, “French business 
controllers still often wonder what their role is”. 
 
Cultural context: French specificities in hierarchical relations and performance 
assessment 
D’Iribarne’s (1989) analysis of national management methods brings out the tensions and 
contradictions that exist between the French way of management and the principles and 
methods of management accounting. These contradictions have a significant impact on 
the work of management accountants in France.  
The honor principle 
D’Iribarne (1989) describes French organizations as being founded on a “honor 
principle”. Some of the rules applicable in a “French-style management model”, 
particularly the vision of responsibilities and judgment criteria, but also hierarchical 
relations inside organizations, are not without impact on the place and role of 
management accountants6. 
 
According to d’Iribarne (1989), French society is marked by strong corporatism (which 
Bourdieu (1989) calls the “esprit de corps”). Every individual is defined by his or her 
“status”, which confers certain prerogatives but also obligations: 
Each of the groups I observed appears to be not only attached to prerogatives, but 
also duties. Each “status” is marked by a demanding idea of the responsibilities 
incumbent on its members solely by virtue of belonging to it, without having to be 
required by some authority; there are many duties that must be fulfilled above and 
beyond any legal and contractual obligations, and any formal sanction threatening 
the man [sic] who shirks them. Far from being incompatible with the defense of 
particularisms and privileges, this vision of duty is closely associated with it. 
(d'Iribarne, 1989, p.57) 
                                               
6 The idea of a “national culture” is necessarily an over-simplification (McSweeney, 2002; Scheytt et al., 
2003). Firm managers can be considered as a homogeneous group since they have been through various 
selection processes that are particularly discriminating as they are based on “elective affinity” (Boltanski, 
1982; Bourdieu, 1989). However, we should not ignore the diversity of practices and perceptions, which 
have in fact evolved substantially under the influence of Anglo-American management methods (Djelic and 
Zarlowski, 2005). We use the cultural analysis proposed by d’Iribarne (1989) because it brings out certain 
features that are coherent with the perceptions of the people we interviewed for empirical studies. We thus 
draw inspiration from this analysis “pragmatically and as a heuristic device” (Scheytt et al., 2003, p.520), 
while remembering that it is simplistic to want to describe the whole of French society in just a few clearly-
defined concepts.  
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D’Iribarne outlines a connection between this view of responsibility as independent of 
any legal, hierarchical and contractual framework and the concept of honor as defined by 
Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws:  
What every group considers honorable or contrary to honor is not defined by reason, 
or by law, or by the prince. It is a “prejudgement”. It depends “on its own caprice”, 
not the will of any other person. Only a tradition can set it. It is less “what we owe to 
others than what we owe ourselves”; it is not “so much what calls us towards our 
fellow citizens as what distinguishes us from them”. It is closely bound up with pride 
in one’s “rank” and the fear of being deprived of it. (d'Iribarne, 1989, p.59) 
 
This logic of responsibility founded on honor means that each individual wishes to work 
(or feels they work) for an objective that reaches beyond the sphere of their own direct 
interest. The organization thus benefits from “the intensity with which each person 
applies themselves to their work, as long as he [sic] feels honored” (d’Iribarne, 1989, 
p.98). But “height”, “rank” and “distinction” lead people to refuse anything that could 
reduce them to a servile condition. Since honor is what everyone “owes themselves”, the 
forms of incentive will only be effective if they preserve a feeling of independence, and 
servile submission is contrary to honor.  
In their idea of work, French management accountants appear to follow the national 
culture. But that culture is not totally convergent with a management accounting logic 
founded on a view of the organization that tends to be associated with an Anglo-
American idea of responsibilities and relations at work in which the contract plays a 
central role. While the two logics are not totally opposed (both, for example, stress the 
notion of independence), they do sometimes conflict. This has an effect on the work, 
position and role management accountants may hope for in French firms. We examine 
four points of tension: the service relationship, the concept of control, the concept of 
accountability and the relationship with financial data. 
 
Helping without becoming servile  
Hopper (1980), in a UK setting, presents the service role for management accountants as 
prestigious, but the French view of the relationship to work sees more ambiguous 
connotations in the idea of “service”. In a logic of honor, service is perceived as low-
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prestige when it is considered equivalent to a situation of servitude (d’Iribarne, 1989). 
This is a general concern for all support functions (Lambert, 2005). They often try to 
avoid being perceived as “at the service of” others, which can easily be considered as a 
relationship of servility in which everyone must know their place. Instead, they present 
themselves as “helping” and “cooperating” with managers in a relationship of exchange 
between individuals who consider themselves peers. As d’Iribarne (1989, p.109) notes: 
“It is perfectly honorable to do voluntarily, “to help”, something that would be 
humiliating to do under the obligations of a position where one is “at the service of”.” 
This idea also means managers with whom good informal relationships have been built 
up will be less reluctant to respond to management accountants’ requests for information 
(Morales and Lambert, 2013). “Cultivating” relationships by personalization and special 
arrangements, opening the door to cooperation in a give-and-take dynamic that extends 
over time, can limit the asymmetry of service relationships and encourage mutual trust 
and cooperation (Bigus, 1972). Gaining acceptance in units they are supposed to work 
with and developing interpersonal relationships with managers becomes an integral part 
of management accountants’ work.  
 
The ambivalence of control 
The second tension for French management accountants derives from their name of 
“management controllers”. The French word “contrôle” can mean “check” or 
“inspection” and carries negative connotations of checks by the police, or the tax or legal 
authorities. In France, as in Germany and Austria (but unlike the United Kingdom), 
control is perceived as a form of subordination (Scheytt et al., 2003, p.531). While the 
British tend to see control as an opportunity for personal development, the French 
generally consider it related to an embarrassing, awkward situation: being “controlled” is 
perceived as being a victim of a power structure (Scheytt et al., 2003, p.532). In such a 
context, controllers are often caricatured as following “ridiculous” behavior (Scheytt et 
al., 2003, p.526). 
The very fact that a superior can closely control, or monitor, a junior seems inappropriate 
in France. It is interpreted both as a sign of distrust and as despicable behavior by the 
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superior (d’Iribarne, 1989). This is even truer when an outsider asks a member of the 
group for explanations. In a corporate spirit, “solidarity” must reign between all the 
members of the group, including between superiors and juniors. This means that the 
person sent by the finance division is no more welcome in the operational departments 
than the external auditor in the very same finance division: each person is careful not to 
disclose any information that might put their superior (or junior) in difficulty without 
prior consent, which would be perceived as a form of denunciation. This leads certain 
business partner-style management controllers who are strongly involved in the business 
units to collude with managers to subvert hierarchical control (Lambert and Sponem, 
2005; Lambert and Sponem, 2012).  
 
The limits of accountability 
This ambivalent attitude toward control is hard to reconcile with the central importance of 
accountability processes in Anglo-American systems of management accounting. In 
France, asking a junior for explanations can easily be experienced as a humiliation if the 
junior feels the request is an implicit accusation of incompetence, or indicates a lack of 
trust. Compliments remain implicit and encouragements and congratulations are rarely 
expressed. The bonus and promotion periods are interesting. Asking for a pay rise is 
coherent with a conception of performance in which everyone must advertise themselves; 
talking about one’s own achievements is much more problematic under a honor principle 
that sanctions individuals who do not “know their place” and are too “self-interested” or 
“proud” (Weber, 1989). It is often considered more “natural” in the French business 
culture to receive a promotion without having actively sought it. 
Accountability processes also raise questions in a context where intelligence is reflected 
less in the ability to achieve the objectives set than in the ability to find new ways and get 
round procedures in order to lighten the workload, simplify the task, change the rules of 
the game or divert the attention of distant controllers (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). In a 
culture where rules and monitoring are perceived as contrary to the honor principle, and 
resistance and circumvention are readily celebrated, such compromises are rarely 
considered illegitimate, but rather seen as a clever way to “play the system”, or make up 
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for the absurdity or complexity of hierarchical or bureaucratic directives that are issued 
by remote authorities or are “unreasonable”. And conversely, anyone who simply “does 
as he’s told” is perceived as naïve and lacking in ambition, mediocre, unworthy of honor. 
Asking for proof of the results achieved, holding long meetings where everyone must 
promote their recent achievements, making no secret of successes and failures: the whole 
accountability process is often perceived by the French as a fool’s game or a sham, 
because such exercises appear hard to reconcile with the honor principle, esprit de corps 
and rank. 
Financial data versus “useful” data 
In this situation, figures are accepted, but only if they are useful for understanding “how 
things work” (d’Iribarne, 1989, p.106), if they enable everyone to understand their own 
scope of intervention and act on that. Technical data are more easily accepted than 
financial data. Financial data, particularly if they are used to “judge” “individual 
performance”, can elicit rejection and bafflement. It is not unusual to hear a manager say 
that “you can’t do anything with” accounting data (Morales, 2009). However, collecting 
and using technical data is accepted when the aim is to improve procedures, and the 
manager remains completely in control of them. Figures are thus considered useful, but 
must not come into conflict with the sense of duty and autonomy claimed by individuals 
in the French model of society. To achieve this, figures must help the manager “steer” the 
activity rather than enabling the superior to assess his/her juniors (even if the manager 
and superior in this example are one and the same person); inform him/her about the 
activities managed, but not inform the people to whom he/she is accountable. This tricky 
relationship with figures is central to the safeguarding function of French management 
accountants (Lambert & Sponem, 2012). The data produced and used by management 
controllers, perceived by engineers as less robust than the data they themselves produce, 
and incorporated into a reporting system that shows little congruence with the honor 
principle, are particularly difficult to legitimize in the eyes of French managers7.  
                                               
7 Once again it is important to note that this view covers a range of disparities. Many French managers, 
particularly business school graduates but also many engineers, make extensive use of accounting data. Our 
aim here is simply to highlight the more fragile legitimacy of financial data in French organizations than 
other settings. 
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Problematic positioning: neither accountant, nor manager 
Non-specialist training and various career trajectories 
In contrast to their British and American counterparts, French management accountants, 
like the Germans, are not formally organized into a profession. Theses on the subject of 
French management accountants, although they are not free of bias8, provide a picture of 
their training (Demaret, 2014; Lambert, 2005, Legalais, 2014, Morales, 2009, Redslob, 
2012). The vast majority of people interviewed followed general management studies, 
and did not opt for any specialization in accounting or management accounting. Legalais 
(2014) observes that specialist management accounting courses are finding it difficult to 
attract students, both in universities and business schools. It is extremely rare to find a 
management accountant who is a qualified accountant (or has any other professional 
certification). However, most of them have a qualification equivalent to 5 years of higher 
education, and generally have “cadre” or executive status. Some engineers round off 
their studies with an MBA or 1-year master’s in management before they become 
management accountants. Management accountants may complete an internship in 
management accounting during university, in certain cases complemented by experience 
in auditing which they see as a kind of finishing school. Both students and practitioners 
appear to value an education that combines general management knowledge (acquired 
through a postgraduate course in the case of engineers) with practical specialization in 
management accounting.  
Ahrens and Chapman (1999) show that the difference in educational background has a 
strong influence on perception of the role that management accountants are prepared to 
play in organizations. Auditing experience also influences the management accountants’ 
view, making them more inclined to perceive themselves as guardians of internal control 
and objectivity in figures, while engineers are generally more interested in the “realities 
of the business”. Redslob (2012) and Legalais (2014) show that as their careers progress, 
                                               
8 The people interviewed for management accounting theses are not necessarily representative of the 
general population of French management accountants. The bias tends to be conservative: it is possible that 
management accounting doctoral students can more easily contact practitioners who at some point in their 
career had some education in management accounting (either because they are on the alumni lists, or 
through personal connections); engineers, on the other hand, are probably underrepresented (particularly 
engineers who do not hold the title of management accountant even though their work is similar). 
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management accountants in France often seem to have to choose between their 
organizational identity and their occupational identity. As a result French management 
accountants follow a varied range of career trajectories that are open-ended but lack 
uniformity. Puyou (2015), for example, sees a distinction between management 
accountants from the operational side of business and their counterparts who consider 
themselves primarily as financial specialists (and move between group companies, or 
between groups); this places them in separate professional networks, with different 
expectations and consequences as regards the nature of the reporting information sent to 
the upper echelons. Legalais (2014) and Redslob (2012) also demonstrate differences in 
perspective: some have a career plan built around management accounting (the ultimate 
goal generally being to reach a CFO post) while others only see it as a transitional phase 
(a few years as management accountant will give them financial skills that will later be 
useful for operational or general management posts). 
This diversity of profiles is not without impact on the boundaries of the occupation’s 
jurisdiction, which are much vaguer in France than in countries where the regulated 
management accounting profession has considerable influence (Canada, UK, USA, New 
Zealand, Australia, etc.). French management accountants thus have more latitude, but 
their positioning in the organization appears to be more tenuous than in these English-
speaking countries, in relation to both managers and competitors of the function. 
 
The function and its “competitors” 
French management accountants seek to define their work in relation to, and by 
differentiation from, various organizational groups. The literature, for example, has 
demonstrated their connections with marketing (Farjaudon, 2007; Farjaudon and Morales, 
2013), purchasing (Sebti et al., 2015), quality (Demaret, 2014), and R&D (Morales, 
2009). But the most significant connection is their relationship with the accounting 
departments.  
French management accountants make it a point of honor that they should not be taken 
for accountants. This is a recurrent finding in the theses written on the topic (Lambert, 
2005; Morales, 2009; Demaret, 2014; Legalais, 2014). The distinction is doubtless 
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explained by the negative stereotypes of the accounting profession (Bougen, 1994; 
Friedman & Lyne, 1997; 2001), which are particularly marked in France where being an 
accountant does not carry the same prestige as in other countries. But it is also coherent 
with the cultural analysis presented earlier. When asked what differentiates them from 
accountants, French management accountants often say “considering the bigger picture” 
(as opposed to accountants who are believed to focus on the detail) and producing figures 
that are useful for decision-making, in contrast to accounting documents that are useful 
for their detail and precision rather than for their influence on operational decisions. 
Accounting figures are perceived to be associated with an aim of monitoring, assessment 
and self-justification, while management accountants want to supply instruments 
managers could use for their own purposes, and which are “really” useful for “steering” 
the activity. This symbolic distinction between the autonomous (and thus honorable) 
manager and the (negatively-perceived) hierarchical supervisor is what explains their 
desire to avoid becoming too closely associated with the accountant’s role. 
One relationship that is perhaps less studied is the management accountants’ relationship 
with the IT departments. And yet they increasingly interact with the IT team9, who are 
sometimes specialized in accounting and financial systems (Morales, 2009). This is 
because management accountants need to be familiar with the information systems (in 
many cases, they were involved in development of the system architecture) just as much 
as they need to understand operational processes10. They also have to monitor major IT 
projects, which are sometimes extremely expensive. They regularly ask the IT division to 
develop “solutions” that are useful for the finance division. But in addition to all this 
collaboration, management accountants may find themselves positioned more clearly as 
competitors to the IT specialists when a control system for operational managers is to be 
                                               
9 The time spent with IT teams is rarely mentioned in the literature, even though the parameters of an ERP 
system cannot be set without IT specialists. This is because this relationship is not “operational”, but 
between two functions. The management accountants’ attitude to IT colleagues is very similar to the 
attitude they criticize in operationals towards themselves. 
10 Management accountants’ work has been strongly affected by the generalization of certain IT software 
packages (Puyou and Faÿ, 2015), from data warehouses to ERP systems, via consolidation, budgeting and 
investment management software. These types of software have made it possible to automate a large 
number of tasks, although some tasks are still performed manually, as reflected in the extensive use of 
spreadsheets. Some people complain that they spend less time collecting data but more time correcting 
them, for example when they have to find data input errors that have led to irregular figures (Morales & 
Lambert, 2013). 
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designed. Such systems are built on accounting and operational data, involving 
mechanisms that relate to management accounting but operate through an IT medium, 
and for these reasons they are often produced in collaboration with the IT specialists. 
Meanwhile, the IT specialists occasionally develop financial competence that means they 
are able to respond directly to requests from operational staff, bypassing the management 
accountants. As a result a degree of competition can emerge around this activity. 
Although they are far from any form of social closure (Sarfatti Larson, 1977), French 
management accountants are keen to establish a certain monopoly: for example, they 
want to be the only people able to determine the legitimate measures of performance 
(Farjaudon & Morales, 2013). Their scope of activity depends broadly on a definition that 
is locally-situated, because it is influenced by power struggles, personalities and 
organizational traditions. Due to their personal view of their post, they seek to delegate 
tasks considered non-relevant to other departments, but also want to appropriate or “take 
over” certain other tasks (Lambert, 2005). Delegation, here, is a way to reduce the 
workload or avoid the “dirty work” (Morales and Lambert, 2013), but also involves the 
loss of a zone of responsibility. This situation is particularly sensitive as regards 
interaction with operational staff. 
 
Selling their work to the operationals 
In France as in many other countries, the “business partner” myth prevails (Morales & 
Lambert, 2013). Management accountants are encouraged to “leave their desks and 
spreadsheets” (their “ivory tower”) and bring “added value” to the managers. But French 
management accountants are not always very warmly received by “the operationals” 
(Morales and Lambert, 2013). Oriot (2004), for example, shows that while management 
accountants and operational staff can have a complementary relationship, they can also 
become locked into an undermining or broken relationship. This happens because 
management accountants suffer from a rather negative image (Redslob, 2012; Legalais, 
2014) and have to gain acceptance by showing that they are not “spies from the general 
management”, helping the people they deal with to “overcome the fear of surveillance” - 
which is contrary to honor. 
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Even when the management accountants are accepted and manage to overcome their 
function’s negative stereotypes, cooperation with operational staff often remains relative. 
The management accountants must also legitimize their work itself (Morales, 2009; 
Demaret, 2014). They often say they have to “sell their work”, “charm” the operationals 
and spend their time “educating” managers to explain why it is in their interest to refer to 
them. And yet discussions with operationals primarily concern reporting and budgeting 
activities, and are thus moments of hierarchical accountability (Morales and Lambert, 
2013). The management accountants would prefer to play the roles of coordinator and 
advisor, which require regular cooperation independently of assessment processes. But 
that is a very specific role for management accountants, and one that certain managers 
and organizations do not necessarily want to encourage. 
From a qualitative study of 93 management accountants working in multinational firms 
that are leaders on their respective markets, Lambert (2005) has shown that while certain 
management accountants benefit from authority in decision-making and have “equal-
footing” relationships with managers, this is by no means always the case. “Discreet” 
functions, which appear to concern the majority of the people interviewed, and 
“safeguarding” functions suffer from a lack of recognition and several tactics are used to 
try and obtain greater authority (Lambert, 2005; Lambert and Sponem, 2012). At the 
other end of the spectrum, in the rare cases of organizations that have to implement a 
structural cost-killing strategy, management accountants can become central links in the 
organization, monitored guards in a panopticon, set up as truth-tellers within the 
organization (Lambert and Pezet, 2011). This makes them direct competitors with 
managers, in some cases taking their place. 
The “business partner”, the mythical figure of the modern management accountant that is 
often presented as a magical cure-all, has not become established as an uncontestable 
norm in organizational practices, however efficient the organization (Lambert & Sponem, 
2012). Rather than a generalization of the “business partner management accounting 
function”, we are seeing the emergence of a new segment within the function, the 
“business partner” assisted by other management accountants who specialize in 
production of reporting (Morales, 2009).  
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This combination is presented as a solution to the problem of manager accountability: the 
business partner who is friendly with operationals is counterbalanced by a guardian who 
guarantees validity in the figures. To guarantee their credibility with operationals, 
business partners must demonstrate their awareness of the potential side-effects of short-
term, opportunistic management accounting which is too inflexible and encourages 
“gaming” and blame avoidance - a system based on “naming and shaming” rather than 
giving people control over their operations generates “irresponsible behaviors” (Bouquin, 
1998, p. 12). They promote the idea that their objective is not to produce information (an 
activity that is delegated to the reporting team), but to analyze and interpret that 
information, i.e. relate it to an operational event (Morales, 2013). Management 
accountants thus position themselves within a discourse of their added value lying in their 
“neutrality”: the fact that they are independent of line management guarantees all parties 
a viewpoint, thus ensuring objectivity in the numbers produced, whereas operationals 
seek to defend an interpretation that is favorable to them. The management accountants 
are positioned at the interface between senior management and operational departments: 
for the operationals they “translate” the hierarchical constraints expressed in accounting 
language by the management, and for the remote managers they report on operational 
events that give meaning to the figures (Legalais & Morales, 2014).  
This positioning strategy does not always work, and may lead to the disappearance of the 
business partner, as the management accountant’s only remaining function is to supply 
and guarantee the reporting. Some people even talk of “pre-consolidation”, thus stressing 
their role as guarantor of the figures, which appears to have become more important than 
all other roles11. Managers may also become the management accountants’ primary 
competitors. In mass consumption industries, for instance, brand managers spend most of 
their time analyzing past returns and estimating potential ones. In the automotive 
industry, pricing specialists spend most of their time in tasks that could perfectly fit 
management accountants’ duties. These positions do not report to the financial 
management but often directly to a line manager, and need hybrid skills to understand 
                                               
11 Some people emphasize the pressure from institutional investors and financial markets, which impose 
reporting deadlines that are becoming harder to meet and require control systems focusing primarily on 
creation of value for the shareholder. Their work is thus shaped by the needs of financial reporting. 
Paradoxically, the financialization of organizations does not necessarily result in a broader role for 
management accountants.  
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both operations and accounting. Although they may be reluctant to deal with accounting 
data, engineers are not afraid of figures and produce many indicators to monitor their 
work, including measures for costs and margins where necessary. These indicators are 
based on categories that are often more relevant for the engineers than the categories used 
by management accountants (Morales, 2009; Redslob, 2012). The French tableau de bord 
(Bourguinon et al., 2004) is thus often constructed without any input from management 
accountants.  
Conclusion 
In contrast to the British cost accountants described by Loft (1986), French management 
accountants (or “management controllers”) are not formally organized into a profession, 
and have not based their occupational aims on the model of chartered or certified 
accountants. For a long time they were more similar to engineers, but they have gradually 
sought to differentiate themselves and avoid competition with engineers, of the kind 
experienced in the United States (Abbott, 1988). However, accounting and finance 
departments do not share the prestige of engineers in France. Management controllers 
usually have a relatively humble reputation, which affects the occupation’s identity 
construction. They must find (and defend) a position in relation to other competing 
groups and demonstrate their relevance to other people, beginning with the operational 
managers. Doubts are sometimes cast on their technical skills and legitimacy (Demaret, 
2014). The traditional tools of management accounting, but above all their use as a 
measure of individual performance, are clearly marked by a specific culture. The sacred 
dimension of figures and their systematic use in individual performance assessment are 
coherent with the American pattern of action, in which the contract and the associated 
limited liability play a central role. In France, figures are not sacred and their use as a 
measure of performance conflicts with the conception of responsibility. In this 
environment, the use of figures can appear legitimate as long as the individuals perceive 
themselves as being in control of the figures, and the figures concerned are useful for 
improving their entity’s operation. 
The challenge facing management accountants in France is thus how to carve out a place 
where they can supply interpretations that reincorporate elements of context, reading 
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“between the figures” in a detached but positive way, to give managers the control and 
enlightenment that makes them wholly “responsible” in coherence with the honor 
principle. This is not an easy position, since direct intervention by a management 
accountant into what (in France) is perceived as the manager’s responsibility could be 
equivalent to relieving the manager of some of his or her duties. An expert who helps to 
decode accounting language may be welcome, but a representative of the distant authority 
(a “spy”) will easily be kept out of the information channels (until he or she must beg for 
the figures needed to prepare the reporting). Also, while the mythical figure of the 
“business partner” is presented as the ideal model, it must not bring about a loss of 
independence that would place the management accountant “at the service of” the 
operationals. A partner who “helps” without “removing responsibility”, who succeeds in 
putting across “tough messages” without losing the “trust” of the people he or she deals 
with – such a position is naturally unstable, ambivalent and unsettled. The French 
management accountants’ major ambition is to demonstrate that their specific expertise is 
relevant for managers (Lambert, 2005; Morales, 2009; Redslob, 2012; Demaret, 2014; 
Legalais, 2014). This ambition remains largely unfulfilled to date. 
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